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The Poor Man’s Fight: Mercenary Soldiers in the Civil War: An Interview with 
William Marvel 
Abstract 
Over the course of this year, we’ll be interviewing some of the speakers from the upcoming 2018 CWI 
conference about their talks. Today we are speaking with William Marvel, an independent scholar of 
mid-19th-century American History. Marvel is the author of eighteen books, including most recently, 
Lincoln’s Mercenaries: Economic Motivation among Union Soldiers, which is due for release by LSU Press 
in the early fall of 2018. Some of Marvel’s additional publications include: Lincoln’s Autocrat: The Life of 
Edwin Stanton (UNC Press, 2015), A Place Called Appomattox (UNC Press, 2000), and Andersonville: The 
Last Depot (UNC Press, 1994), for which he won a Lincoln Prize, the Douglas Southall Freeman History 
Award, and the Malcolm and Muriel Barrow Bell Award. He has also written a four-volume history of the 
Civil War that was published by Houghton Mifflin between 2006 and 2011. Mr. Marvel is currently working 
on a biography of Fitz John Porter. [excerpt] 
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THE GETTYSBURG COMPILER 
ON THE FRONT LINES OF HISTORY 
The Poor Man’s Fight: Mercenary 
Soldiers in the Civil War: An Interview 
with William Marvel 
By Ashley Whitehead Luskey 
Over the course of this year, we’ll be interviewing some of the speakers from the upcoming 
2018 CWI conference  about their talks. Today we are speaking with William Marvel, an 
independent scholar of mid-19th-century American History. Marvel is the author of eighteen 
books, including most recently, Lincoln’s Mercenaries: Economic Motivation among Union 
Soldiers, which is due for release by LSU Press in the early fall of 2018. Some of Marvel’s 
additional publications include: Lincoln’s Autocrat: The Life of Edwin Stanton (UNC Press, 
2015), A Place Called Appomattox (UNC Press, 2000), and Andersonville: The Last 
Depot (UNC Press, 1994), for which he won a Lincoln Prize, the Douglas Southall Freeman 
History Award, and the Malcolm and Muriel Barrow Bell Award. He has also written a four-
volume history of the Civil War that was published by Houghton Mifflin between 2006 and 
2011. Mr. Marvel is currently working on a biography of Fitz John Porter. 
 
William Marvel. Image courtesy of the Conway Historical Society 
CWI: Tell us about your most recent work on mercenary soldiers.  How does this 
project build upon the work of other scholars of soldier motivation and the soldier 
experience during the Civil War?  What commonalities and differences does your work 
on mercenary soldiers reveal about Union and Confederate soldier experiences and 
motivation? 
Marvel: Over the course of several years, while writing a four-volume history of the 
Civil War, I found abundant evidence that large numbers of Union soldiers were 
suffering financially when they enlisted. The financial benefits of enlisting seemed to 
exert an influence not only during the bounty era, but even in the earliest days of the 
war. In fact, the earliest volunteers included the heaviest proportion of economically 
distressed recruits. Historians seem to have forgotten that sectional antagonism 
following the election of 1860 precipitated an abrupt and virulent recession that 
wrought widespread unemployment, underemployment, business failures, and 
commercial stagnation from the Gulf of Maine to the Missouri River. As might be 
expected, the victims of that recession were very heavily represented among those who 
answered the first calls for troops—as were the chronically poor. 
My research in that regard therefore does not so much build upon the work of others 
who have been examining the motives of Union soldiers as it competes with them for 
what might be called market share of motivational probability. There has been a great 
deal of attention paid to patriotic impulse, the adventurous spirit, a desire to prove one’s 
manhood, and the altruism of Union volunteers, including abolitionist fervor, but no 
one has specifically examined or even really considered that many enlisted because they 
needed the money. I’m sure patriotism was a significant factor, given the hysteria 
following the attack on Fort Sumter, and support for the Union was probably first 
among the patriotic ingredients. More personal reasons also figured prominently, and to 
some extent so may have antagonism to slavery—at least as a competitive economic 
institution if not as a moral abomination. The extent to which economic desperation 
drove men into uniform necessarily diminishes the influence of each of those incentives. 
In most cases, more than one factor probably brought soldiers to enlist, but if a man had 
not worked in months, his family was hungry, his debts had piled up, and there seemed 
no other prospect for earning money, then it seems reasonable to question how much 
patriotism moved him, regardless of what he said then or later. 
 Photo depicting the camp life of a soldier from the 31st Pennsylvania and his family who has followed 
him to war, taken outside Washington, D.C., 1862.  Image courtesy of the Library of Congress 
Unlike those who have considered other enlistment motives, I have been able to buttress 
my anecdotal testimony and circumstantial evidence with statistical analyses of the 
economic status of those who enlisted. Thanks to a new survey of the 1860 census by the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series at the University of Minnesota, I was able to find 
median-wealth figures for each of the Northern states, against which I matched the 
family wealth of thousands of Union soldiers. Overall, two-thirds of the men I surveyed 
came from families in the poorer half of the population, and the proportion was much 
higher at the beginning of the conflict: In some units the proportion exceeded 80 
percent, and even approached 90 percent. 
However, historian Joe Glatthaar’s census research indicates that the Confederate 
soldier was far less likely to be attracted by pecuniary gain, and that seems perfectly 
logical for several reasons. The Confederacy was being invaded before the conflict was 
six weeks old, and as much as Confederate soldiers are demonized today for defending 
slavery, they were also defending their homeland. Confederate money depreciated faster 
than currencies in the loyal states, making the Confederacy’s lower army pay and 
smaller bounties an even less inviting reason to enlist. Neither does there appear to have 
been as great an effort by the Confederate civilian population as by Northern 
communities to raise funds for the support of soldiers’ families. And then there was the 
earlier and more comprehensive Confederate conscription, which raised troops directly, 
by compulsion; this obviated the need for the exorbitant bounties that had to be raised 
in the North, where the war and the draft enjoyed far less popular support and the 
threat of conscription was mainly a means of encouraging volunteers. 
CWI: How does an understanding of Civil War soldiers as mercenaries reshape our 
understanding of the relationship between soldiers and the state during the 1860s?  Of 
the relationships between soldiers and officers on the battlefield?  In what ways did the 
Civil War conform to or deviate from previous patterns in the American military 
tradition? 
Marvel: I should point out that I don’t really consider most Union soldiers mercenaries 
in the popular, pejorative sense of the word, although men who enlisted because they 
needed the money met the technical definition. If, however, we recognize that many who 
enlisted in Lincoln’s army might never have done so had they not been financially 
embarrassed, it might modify the common perception of the Union soldier as morally 
superior to his less-patriotic modern counterpart. Family income has been identified as 
“an important predictor” in whether an American enters military service today, and 
quite likely it always has been. In his People’s History of the United States, Howard 
Zinn noted that the opportunity to improve one’s economic condition and social status 
drew men into the army at least as early as the Revolution. 
 
Civil War bounty poster. Image courtesy of the Library of Congress 
Statistics now suggest that the poorer elements of society were disproportionately 
represented in the ranks of the Union army, and some well-educated officers and 
noncommissioned officers observed that most of the enlisted men were unsuited to 
more complicated tasks than manual labor. That portrait is not very compatible with the 
traditional concept of the Civil War soldier as the equal of his officers in every way save 
authority, and a greater social distance probably separated most enlisted men from most 
officers than we who were weaned on the imagery of Bruce Catton grew up believing. It 
may not have mirrored the class divisions of the British army of that same period, but I 
think it was more pronounced than we have been inclined to admit. 
CWI: What new insights does your work provide on the postwar soldier experience and 
the war’s lasting impacts on government-civilian relationships? On the evolving nature 
of the American military system? 
Marvel: I deal only briefly with the postwar years. Much further statistical analysis 
would be required to support a more definitive assessment—but, having shown that the 
Union armies were filled mainly from the poorer classes of society, I would suggest that 
so heavy a proportion of poor veterans helped fuel the postwar demand for pensions. 
That was especially true for the later service pensions, which were granted even to those 
without service-connected disabilities. In the 19th century, men from chronically poor 
families, as a significant percentage of Union soldiers were, usually had to rely on their 
own labor to earn a living. Most veterans were approaching late middle age and were 
developing the physical infirmities that often interfere with manual labor by the time the 
pension eligibility requirements were relaxed enough to allow virtually all of them to 
apply. Most of them did apply, too. 
 
Unidentified Maine infantry private, ca. 1862.  Image courtesy of www.MaineMemory.net 
The economics of Civil War volunteering may also have contributed to an increase in the 
popularity of public-sector employment. Veterans whose federal, state, and local 
governments had provided them with short-term economic relief in the form of 
bounties, military pay, and support for their families often seemed predisposed to seek 
more permanent income through public employment after the war. Quite a few young 
men who had sought military commissions as their best (or only) available opportunity 
for employment in 1861 undertook careers in the army after the war. Veterans also 
swarmed into civilian government service—and particularly federal government service. 
In Washington alone, the number of federal employees tripled from 1861 to 1871, and 
grew twenty-fold between the eve of the Civil War and the dawn of the new century; 
there were also two and a half times as many post offices in 1890 as there had been in 
1860, with the number of postal employees ballooning far more than that despite a great 
deal of postwar consolidation. Veterans enjoyed preferential selection for many of those 
new jobs, and tens of thousands of them secured federal appointments in the postal 
service, the Pension Bureau, and the Treasury Department. Veterans’ organizations 
provided the personal associations that led to such jobs for many men who, before the 
war, would never have been able to marshal the political connections necessary for 
government employment. 
The relative economic disadvantage of the average Union soldier may not illustrate an 
aspect of evolution in our military system so much as it reflects an enduring 
phenomenon. Military service in 1861 offered more incentives and opportunities for 
recruits from the lower classes than it did for the more affluent, and the same appears to 
be true today. Increased demand for sophisticated technical expertise may change that, 
but a 2008 study concluded that military service was then still primarily the choice of 
those from the lower economic strata. 
 
 
 
